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PHILOSOPHY 
Physicalism and Humanism 
Robert Sheehan* 
In recent years philosophers have been discussing the 
pros and cons of the "Identity Hypothesis" of Herbert 
Feig! (Feig!, 1958). The Identity Hypothesis holds that 
feelings, expressed or described in phenomenalist lan-
guage, are identical to brain states as described by rapidly 
developing neural science. The discussions abound with 
Ockham's Razor, attacks on and defenses of emergent-
ism, and appeals to Turing Machines as analogues (Hook, 
1960). 
This paper does not propose to enter that particular 
dispute, although the author believes the Identity the-
orists have made the better case thus far. Rather, it is 
here proposed ,to widen the frame of reference surround-
ing such disputes. For, underlying the arguments, are 
considerations as to the promise of physical science for 
explaining our feelings, attitudes, language, acts, and be-
havior. An appraisal of such promise would seem to 
demand that account be taken of sciences other than 
neurophysiology which purport to explain our feelings, 
language, and acts. The three sciences particularly con-
cerned are psychology, sociology, and linguistics. 
The Self Pragmatically Considered 
All too often individual psychology and social psychol-
ogy have pursued their own lines of investigation without 
weighing the alternative explanations sufficiently. Indi-
vidual psychology's left wing assumes that the individual 
is free, given certain conditions, to change or alter con-
siderably his basic pattern. "Self-actualization" has be-
come a rallying cry for this very humanist trend, which 
has many parallels with certain notions in existentialism. 
The social psycholog,ist, on the other hand, stresses the 
environmental factors determining one's fundamental life 
pattern. The point here is not to take sides: freedom 
against determinism, or conversely, but to ask whether 
the language of either or both protagonists is irreducibly 
macroscopic in reference. , 
Writers such as Eric Fromm (1956), Abraham Mas-
low ( 1962), Carl Rogers ( 1961), and Everett Shostrom 
( 1967) use the term "person" and "self" in ways which 
are emotionally significant as well as having some descrip-
tive function. That is, their writing has a double purpose: 
to convey understanding and to stimulate psychological 
growth. The self, for the so-called "Third School of Psy-
chology," is to be cherished and cared for; if it is loved, 
it will provide entrance to constructive relations with 
others. But if the self is construed as a set of processes in 
the reticular activating system (Fair, 1963), then it ap-
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pears that the pragmatic function of the language under-
pinning therapy is in jeopardy. For there are few, it seems, 
who would regard some redundant circuitry as worthy of 
self esteem. Men can find their feelings enhanced by a 
close awareness of ocean, of trees, of wind, of grass under 
the sun, or perhaps by practicing yoga; but to a configu-
ration of neurons the response is generally interest -
questioning perhaps - but not an enlargement of self-
consciousness. 
This state of affairs may be temporary; it may be an 
aesthetic lag. If so, it would be interesting to investigate 
the conditions surrounding it. It has nothing to do with a 
dualist view of man, for some of those who respond 
strongly to nahiral beauty both feel and understand man 
to be simply part of nature ( Gibran, 1966). It may be 
the case that a negative response to physicalism, in either 
the reductionist or broad sense, is after all due to a reluc-
tance to give up any vestige of hope for immortality. So 
long as man remains somewhat mysterious, so long as 
there is always "something more" which science cannot 
explain, thus far can one, even in secret, hope for the 
Great Survival. 
If the last speculation is somewhat implausible, the 
following one is obvious. We gain our early notions about 
ourselves especially from what is, phenomenally speaking, 
outside ourselves; from others: their appearances, their 
movements, their shapes, their smells, their sounds. Our 
own bodies become part of the picture and a whole host 
of images, gestalten if you will, is developed, to become 
an integral part of our psychological life. These living 
functions seem to some to be destroyed when analyzed. 
"Seem" is emphasized here because there is a fallacy in-
volved: that an explanans necessarily replaces its expla-
nandum. I hope to show that micro explanations, in many 
cases, are unable to replace their explananda, not only 
from the pragmatic standpoint, but also from the theo-
retical one. 
In spite of the imagined threats on the part of neuro-
physiology, the life of feeling goes on, around a dominant 
theme, a fearful one, or a confident one, but a set of feel-
ings which is partly responsible for the kind of personal 
world we create. Clearly, from the standpoint of life in 
the living, it contributes nothing to consider these feelings 
as axonal firings with visceral reverberations. 
Consider the example of face-to-face interaction with 
other people. Smiles, frowns, sneers, soothing or irritat-
ing talk are the currency of such transactions. As such 
they are meaningful units. A shrug of the shoulder or a 
brush of the hand are analyzable into processes of the 
efferent nervous system, together with the muscle and 
skeletal systems. But it is not as so analyzed that they are 
effective in social interactions; it is only as perceived phe-
nomenally that they communicate. Inasmuch as the terms 
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of social science and parts of psychology are concerned 
with describing the conditions making such transactions 
and relations possible, so much are they theoretically 
irreducible to any in micro science. 
Linguistics and Reductionism 
Arising out of the intersection of our needs, ecological 
and linguistic settings, human interactions and creativity, 
the concept of culture is both problem and point of de-
parture for the social sciences. Culture thus has parame-
ters in biology, as Morris (I 968) and Lorenz (1966) at-
test. What must be remembered in such work is that, 
while the remote history of culture is phylogenetic, its 
recent past is shot through with symbol systems, both 
linguistic and otherwise, which are, of course, diverse 
throughout the world and in time (Manis and Meltzer, 
1967). If, at some future time, a neurolinguistics de-
velops; if we discover the physiological correlates of, say, 
Chomsky's ( 1957) syntactic structures, even in this case 
the symbol systems themselves, as artifacts, can be studied 
in terms of their organization and functions. 
Molecular and Organismic Biology 
In defense of biology itself as irreducible to physics and 
chemistry, Barry Commoner (1961) has offered a num-
ber of arguments. Commoner does not, of course, deplore 
recent advances in molecular biology; what he does de-
plore is the separation, even alienation, of the newer, 
more glamorous areas of research from the more classical 
studies. The folrowing is one of his arguments: 
Classical plant morphologists have produced 
monumental works on starch grains, which 
have unique structural organization closely cor-
related with the plant's specific character. In 
more recent years an equally impressive body 
of knowledge about the chemical substances 
extractable from the starch grain-amylose and 
amylopectin-has accumulated. Moreover en-
zymes that synthesize these substances have 
been isolated. Yet an analysis of the informa-
tion available from studies of extracts shows 
that we do not understand how the enzymes 
could possibly account for the presence togeth-
er in the starch grain of both amylose and amyl-
opectin in proportions which are under genetic 
control. Clearly, our attention must now return 
to the developing starch grain, and we must 
learn how the cellular environment can give to 
a precise correlation between the two paths of 
biosynthesis that cannot be accounted for in 
terms of test tube chemistry. 
Cooperative efforts may or may not have been made 
in this case, but the need for such continual cooperation 
is manifest. That cooperation is often lacking is discussed 
by Commoner ( 1961) in terms of a proces of alienation 
which he sees setting in as soon as an important biological 
problem becomes susceptible to chemical or physical 
attack; in the end the question becomes lost to biology. 
But the rub is, Commoner claims, that in each case the 
chemical-physical researches run their course and come 
to a dead stop in the regions surrounding the living cell. 
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The return to biology is, by this time, a practical impos-
sibility, not the least reason for which is the reluctance of 
the mother to welcome back her prodigal, but fast-talking 
offspring. 
Commoner further contends that misunderstandings of 
the popular DNA story have contributed to the wide-
spread belief, represented in Asimov ( 1960), for exam-
ple, that, "Modern science has all but wiped out the 
borderline between life and non-life." 
"I sometimes think," Commoner ( 1961) retorts, " that 
the difficulties we now face in controlling water, air, and 
soil pollution, and the undue dissemination of radioactive 
materials, are the result of a common impression that, 
' the boundary between life and non-life has all but dis-
appeared'." 
While it is quite true that pre-Wittgensteinian modes 
of definition will simply not do for living systems, never-
theless a list of defining characteristics can be drawn up, 
reflecting the quorum feature of language, which will 
serve well enough. Borderline cases can be treated casual-
ly; rather than be disturbed by them, we should welcome 
them, since evolutionary theory does, after all, demand 
a continuum. In addition to a sophisticated view of defini-
tion, what is required is a theory of explanation which is 
pluralistic, thus allowing the explanandum a life even 
after it has been assigned an explanans. 
For the sake of biology itself, to say nothing of social 
sciences, psychology, and, not least, human living, it is 
important to resist the tendency to think that, because 
our macroscopic units are analyzable into the molecular, 
such units are meaningless except as so considered. This 
suggests no return to vitalism; for, if the history of science 
has shown us anything, it is that vital processes are thor-
oughly physical. Nor is it to be urging that macro units 
be everywhere preserved; rather, it is here suggested that, 
insofar as macro units are given in explananda, insofar 
as they pose problems and have a phenomenal existence, 
thus far are they uneliminable. This is especially the case 
where the data are human beings, as in the social sci-
ences; here the explanations require a macroscopic do-
main of discourse. It also can be the case with the non-
human, and even the non-living, especially seen with the 
eyes of the artist, whose eyes we all ought to have even 
though we do not have the artist's hands. 
Aesthetics and Reductionism 
The area of aesthetics is particularly enlightening in 
discussions of reductionism. It is understandable why 
physics and chemistry fail to excite the artist, for he sees 
sub specie vitae. To be an aesthetic object is to be alive, 
to be growing. Susanne Langer (f 967; 199-210) has put 
it this way: 
... if feeling is a culmination of vital process, 
any articulated image of it must have the sem-
blance of that vital process rising from deep, 
general organic activities and intense and con-
certed acts, such as we perceive directly ... as 
impacts or felt actions. Every artistic form re-
flects the dynamism that is constantly building 
up the life of feeling. 
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A painting or statue is not, at first thought, growing or 
dynamic; Langer ( 1967) explains that in a work of art 
no parts retain their qualitative identity in isolation from 
other parts. They do not relate simply and directly to the 
whole, but, " ... can only reflect each other, enhance or 
otherwise modify each other." In art, of course, the medi-
um is illusion. 
In a Cambodian Buddha statue, for instance, 
there is usually a perfect elaboration of the 
head, and a flowing line to the hands, which are 
given slightly less articulation; the torso and 
crossed legs are very simply treated as large 
surfaces and opposed curves. There is a gradi-
ent of development toward the head, culminat-
ing in the face, and a lesser one toward the 
hands that leads up to their delicate form and 
gesture. Such a figure has the living stillness of 
a plant; its inward action is concentrated in its 
apex, the head, which consequently predomi-
nates without being given any other emphasis 
by way of extraordinary proportion, posture or 
features. 
The scientist must understand that the artist or human-
ist is frightened by reductionist views because what he 
prizes most highly, his feelings, are seen by him as sub-
ject to elimination when explained scientifically. What is 
clearly needed is a limiting principle on explanation. 
There seems to me to be a viable public-private distinc-
tion, one which places no limits on scientific investiga-
tion, but which preserves the values of the intuitionist. 
Explanation involves languages of public observation. 
Once it is recognized that feelings-as-lived are as irre-
ducibly private as explanations are irreducibly public, 
then scientific explanations can be adequate without being 
threatening to the humanist. There is no paradox in this 
if a physicalism is accepted. Privacy does not entail a non-
physical mind; rather, a physical mind entails privacy. 
Conscious experience is within one's own body: com-
municable, expressible, similar to the felt experiences of 
others, nevertheless part of me. It is the distinctness of 
bodies which is the ground for privacy; non-physical 
minds have a way of becoming oversouls or cosmic con-
sciousness. Consciousness is a phase of certain highly 
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specific organic activity; it is not something different from 
that activity, arising out of it or running parallel to it. 
The author believes that a non-reductionist physical-
ism, as roughly sketched in this paper, has a positive rela-
tionship to humanism. If explanations are looked upon as 
symbolic representations of what we experience or value: 
of artistic or political activity, of joyful feelings, of ac-
celerations of distant stars, then men can be threatened 
by false explanations, but not by being signified in the 
language of science. 
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